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SOVEREIGNTY: TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND THE CLAIMS OF NONINDIANS UNDER THE
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Stephen Lafferty*
Introduction
Federal Indian policy has simultaneously accepted dual and con-
flicting premises about Indian tribal autonomy: tribes are "de-
pendent domestic nations"' yet have sovereign powers which pre-
date the Constitution.2 Such equivocation has confused the status
of tribal governments and their exercise of power over those
within their domain. Tribes, for instance, are not bound by either
the fifth or fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion3 and, thus, tribal members do not have constitutional rights
that are enforceable against the tribe. It was not until the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 19681 that Congress exercised its plenary
* Second-place Winner, 1982 Writing Competition.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 25 (1831).
2. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). See also Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); F. COHEN, FEDERAL INMAN LAW 122 (1942) [hereinafter
cited as COHEN]; Note, A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of Tribal
Sovereignty, 6 AMi. INDAN L. REv. 371, 391 (1978).
3. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d
553, 556 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1958).
4. The language and substance differ from the United States Constitution. There is
no establishment clause, no recognition of the interwoven relationship of religion to all
Indian activities, nor any provisions such as the second, third, or seventh amendments to
the Constitution. See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971). Section
1302 of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides in its entirety:
No Indian Tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punish-
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powers' to constrain tribal governments against arbitrary or abu-
sive conduct toward both Indians and non-Indians' on the reser-
vation.
Because a tribe's conduct is proscribed by the Indian Civil Rights
Act, the question becomes: Can the tribe be sued for alleged depri-
vation of individual rights or is there tribal immunity? In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,7 the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed tribal sovereign immunity when a tribal member sued her
tribe for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Act. How-
ever, two recent cases, Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe &
Shoshone Tribes,8 and R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous-
ing Authority,9 questioned the application of tribal immunity to
civil rights challenges by non-Indians on the reservation and
reached two opposite conclusions.
In Dry Creek Lodge, non-Indians on the Wind River Reserva-
tion built a guest lodge on their own fee land without acquiring the
necessary fight-of-way across the land of all the Indian families
concerned. When the lodge was completed, one of the families
obtained assistance from the tribes' Joint Business Council'" to
barricade the roadway. This action led to the subsequent closing
of the lodge. When the non-Indian plaintiffs were denied access
to tribal court, they sued for injunctive relief and damages under
the Indian Civil Rights Act." The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
ments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or pun-
ishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
5. Congress's major source of power in Indian affairs is derived from U.S. CONSr.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "[The Congress shall have Power] to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." See United States v.
Wheeler, 4i35 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
6. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978). See Schantz
v. White Lightening, 502 F.2d 67, 70 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp.
26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
7. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
8. 623 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1980).
9. 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981).
10. 623 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1980). The Arapahoe and Shoshone tribes have a Joint
Business Council composed of each tribe's Business Council. The councils are elected and
serve as the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies for the tribes.
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976). See note 4, supra. Party defendants in the first
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peals distinguished Santa Clara as being an intratribal dispute
where internal relief was available to an Indian plaintiff. Con-
trary to the principles of Santa Clara, the court held that the limi-
tations upon tribal sovereign immunity disappeared and were im-
plicitly waived when a non-Indian was denied a tribal remedy. 12
Williams also involved a non-Indian's suit against a tribal gov-
ernment for deprivation of due process rights. Williams had a
contract with the Fort Belknap Housing Authority to build fifty
homes. Due to a warranty dispute, the Authority obtained a writ
of attachment from the tribal court.' 3 Though his property was
attached, Williams refused to stipulate to tribal court jurisdiction
and filed for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Indian
Civil Rights Act.' 4 The district court expressed displeasure with
the breadth of the Santa Clara holding regarding sovereign im-
munity and sought, unsuccessfully, to distinguish the cases. The
court was forced to conclude, however, that Santa Clara is the
prevailing law and the tribe was immune to suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief." The suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and Williams was without a remedy.
Dry Creek Lodge suit in 1974 included the Secretary of Interior, the reservation superin-
tendent, the United States, individuals in the complaining family (the Bonatsies), and the
Joint Business Council. The court of appeals dismissed the claims against the United
States and its agents but found jurisdiction over the tribes and remanded. The jury
returned a plaintiff's verdict and, on motion by the tribes, a new trial was granted. Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), was handed down before the retrial and
then, based on Santa Clara, the district court dismissed. This appeal followed.
12. The court stated:
The reason for the limitations and the references to tribal immunity also disappear
when the issue relates to a matter outside of internal tribal affairs and when it con-
cerns an issue with a non-Indian.
'.. The limitations and restrictions present in Santa Clara should be applied. There
has to be a forum where the dispute can be settled.
623 F.2d 682, 685 (1980).
13. The writ of attachment was ordered without giving Williams prior notice or an
opportunity to be heard. 509 F. Supp. 933, 938 (D. Mont. 1981).
14. William's refusal to consent to the tribe's jurisdiction meant that the tribal court
was without the jurisdiction to order the attachment. The extant tribal code did not con-
fer jurisdiction upon the court. Besides the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, the
plaintiff alleged jurisdiction based on diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332; federal question, 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a); and a civil rights claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in conjunction with 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3). The last three bases were dismissed. 509 F. Supp. 933, 939 (D. Mont.
1981).
15. The sole federal court remedy for violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act is
habeas corpus relief, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, and, therefore, based on Santa Clara, the tribe
was immune to suits seeking other relief. 509 F. Supp. 933, 941. See Santa Clara Pueblo
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While the Supreme Court apparently settled the question of a
waiver of tribal immunity under the Civil Rights Act, Dry Creek
Lodge and Williams raise important questions about the continu-
ing viability of the doctrine as it applies to suits by non-Indians.
As Justice Blackmun said, concurring in Puyallup Tribe v. Wash-
ington Dep't of Game: "I entertain doubts, however, about the
continuing vitality in this day of the doctrine of tribal immunity
as it was enunciated in United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. [Citation omitted.] I am of the view that that doc-
trine may well merit reexamination in an appropriate case."' 6
In light of Justice Blackmun's admonition, these are two ex-
tremely important cases. This note will examine some of the im-
plications for tribal immunity and tribal sovereignty raised by
these conflicting decisions. In order to provide a background for
analyzing these cases, this note will first review the development
of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and sovereign immunity.
Next, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Indian Civil
Rights Act in Santa Clara will be discussed. Finally, it will be
argued that the tribes must resolve this conflict by incorporating
their traditional values and practices into a tribal judicial process
that protects the rights of all Indians and non-Indians on the res-
ervation.
Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Sovereignty and
the Indian Civil Rights Act
The extent to which Indian tribes can exercise their powers as
sovereigns has been questioned throughout the judicial history of
the United States.' 7 Tribes began their relationships with the fed-
eral government as sovereign nations and later agreed to their
roles as weaker powers. They did not surrender tribal independ-
ence or the right of self-government and jurisdiction over the per-
sons and property within their territorial boundaries. 8 While no
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Trans-Canada Enter., Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe,
634 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1980).
16. 433 U.S. 165, 178-79 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
17. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
18. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); CoHEN,
supra note 2, at 122. See also Note, Indian Sovereignty and Judicial Interpretations of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 897, 899. The treaty-making process was in-
tended to ensure a certain degree of dominion over separate territories controlled by the
tribes.
[Vol. 9
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longer possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, 9 tribes re-
main as a separate people2" with the power to regulate their inter-
nal and social relations. 2'
The exercise of tribal sovereignty has been severely limited by
the asserted power of the "overriding sovereign. ' 22 The basic
premise is that Indian tribes have subordinated their sovereign
powers to the federal government, and the limited character of
tribal authority is subject to the complete defeasance by Con-
gress. 23 Divestiture cannot be inferred but must be explicit. 24
19. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
20. Tribes also have been referred to as "unique aggregations possessing attributes
to sovereignty," Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832), and "a good deal
more than 'private, voluntary organizations,'" United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
557 (1975). Neither accords a status indicative of a sovereign capable of having treaty re-
lations with another sovereign. In 1871, Congress declared an end to the recognition of
the tribe as "an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States may
contract by treaty." Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566. United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886), however, solidified the view that tribes are not foreign nations.
See also Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886) (an Indian tribe is not an in-
dependent state or sovereign nation).
21. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). Tribal powers over reser-
vations' internal affairs have been generally upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver,
241 U.S. 602 (1916) (domestic relations); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)
(criminal justice involving tribal members); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,
532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975) (regulation of economic and land use); Wounded Head v.
Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975) (tribal elections);
Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958) (taxing use of trust land).
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 170
(1982), has even suggested that in many respects "Indian tribes' sovereignty over their
own members is significantly greater than the States' power over their own citizens."
22. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
23. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913) (Congress' right to determine when to terminate "guardianship"
status). Even the Supreme Court's recent holding that the power to tax non-Indians con-
ducting business on the reservation is an inherent power necessary to tribal self-govern-
ment, and territorial management is qualified by the comment that "the federal govern-
ment can take away this power." Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141
(1982); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
24. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d
1061 (1st Cir. 1979); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895). But cf. In United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978), the Court discussed three areas of implicit
divestiture owing to the tribes' dependent status: first, the right to alienate freely Indian
land to non-Indians, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667
(1974); second, the right to enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with
foreign nations, Worcester v. Georgia, 32 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); and, third, crimi-
nal trials of nonmembers in tribal courts, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978).
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Silence does not constitute a waiver2" but is a reservation of that
right until "clear indications of legislative intent" 26 are enunci-
ated. Tribes possess only those aspects not withdrawn by treaty,
statute, or as a necessary result of their dependent status. 7 The
anomaly of tribal sovereignty is, therefore, that tribes are consid-
ered to possess those powers of a sovereign state, including the
powers of internal governance" over the tribal members and ter-
ritory, yet, at the whim of the overbearing sovereign, they are
confined to the role of wards29 whose freedom to act is limited by
the plenary powers of Congress.3" Congress has demonstrated its
willingness to wield its power. 3' Even the presence of substantial
energy resources, institutions of higher education, and tribal en-
terprise32 (which contradict the basic notions of incompetency
25. "To presume that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sover-
eign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power ... turns the con-
cept of sovereignty on its head, and we do not adopt this analysis." Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
26. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
27. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The concept of tribes as "domestic dependent nations" was
enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall who, at the same time, described the tribal relation-
ship to the United States as that of "ward to his guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Congress and the courts have never shaken this notion of the In-
dians as too incompetent to manage their own affairs ably.
28. See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. E.K., 471 F.
Supp. 924 (D. Ore. 1979).
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
30. Congress's plenary powers to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is the primary source for the pervasive control asserted by the
federal government in Indian affairs. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
31. Without fully recounting history, one need only consider the forced march along
the Trail of Tears; the General Allotment Act, which took tribal lands and disbursed
much of it to whites; the cultural upheaval that took children from their homes and
denied the right to practice traditional religious ceremonies; the termination and reloca-
tion policies of the post-World War II decade; the Indian Reorganization Act's require-
ment that the Secretary of the Interior grant his approval of substantial tribal decisions;
the sweeping transfer of tribal powers to the states under Public Law 280 and to the
United States under the Major Crimes Act. See generally S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN
POLICY (1973).
32. Approximately 3% of the nation's oil and gas reserves and between 7 and 13%
of the identifiable coal deposits are found on Indian lands. Vast deposits of uranium,
phosphates, and oil shale exist. The Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) was
organized to address the energy-related concerns of twenty-nine tribes. There are sixteen
colleges chartered by tribal enabling legislation. These include Sinte Gleska Community
College on the Rosebud Reservation, Navajo Community College, the Turtle Mountain
(Chippewa) Community College, and Lummi Indian School of Aquaculture. Tribally
owned and managed economic ventures include the White Mountain Apache ski resort,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss2/5
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and wardship33) have not negated the federal government's
authority.
Tribes can stave off further diminution of their right of self-de-
termination and autonomy by preserving their immunity to suit.
Sovereign immunity is an inherent aspect of a tribe's sovereignty
that was never relinquished, not a power conferred by Congress.34
Tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common law
immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers35
and cannot be sued without their consent.3 6
Tribal sovereign immunity is crucial to the integrity of tribal
self-government and autonomy. Constant subjection to suits
could financially debilitate a tribe and would demand an inor-
dinate amount of resources to respond to the demands of private
parties so as to cripple the operation of tribal government.3 As
the Supreme Court has said: "[T]he sovereignty possessing im-
munity should not be compelled to defend.., away from its own
territory or in courts not of its own choice .... This reasoning is
particularly applicable to Indian nations with their government
organization and peculiar problems." 38 This is consistent with the
federal policy of tribal self-determination and, more important,
underlines the function of tribal values, customs, and cultural
tribal ranches, the Lummi fishery, small industrial complexes, and timber development.
See generally 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION: FINAL REPORT (1977).
33. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Joint Tribal Council
of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
34. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061,
1065-66 (Ist Cir. 1979).
35. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978);- United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). Sovereign immunity has been held nof to
depend upon status as a federally recognized tribe, Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599
F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1979), nor on the type of relief being sought, United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., supra (damages), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165
(1977) (declaratory and injunctive relief). Cf. The United States is immune to suit in
federal court as a matter of federal common law. See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S.
354 (1919); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).
36. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895). See also United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Aubertin v. Colville Confederated Tribes,
446 F. Supp. 430 (D. Wash. 1978).
37. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe
of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895). See also COHEN, supra note 2, at 283-84.
38. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940).
Cf. State courts may not exercise jurisdiction over tribes, Puyallup Tribe v. Washington
Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977); State ex rel. California Dep't of Fish & Game
v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1979).
19811
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traditions in creating valid tribal governments. Tribal values of
justice, equity, and fundamental fairness are worthy of deference
so as to permit civil disputes to be resolved away from the scru-
tiny of federal court.3 9
Sovereign immunity, like other aspects of tribal sovereignty, is
subject to the plenary and supreme powers of the federal govern-
ment. 0 A waiver of sovereign immunity requires affirmative stat-
utory authorization4 ' and is of such a character that it "cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed. ' 4 Statutory silence
demonstrates Congress's specific intention to maintain tribal sov-
ereign immunity as a central component of tribal self-deter-
mination.43
Unlike federal and state government sovereignty, Indian tribal
sovereignty predates the Constitution and was not incorporated
into the Constitution. 44 Because their sovereignty is not a constitu-
tional creation, tribal governments are viewed as unconstrained by
39. Tribal governments and their courts are not monolithic. Each tribe has fashioned
structures that intertwine tribal values with Anglo legal systems established under the In-
dian Reorganization Act. Just as the states and the federal government establish the bases
for suits against them, so too should the tribes employ their own values to determine how
best to preserve the tribe. Permitting tribes to be continually subject to legal action in
federal courts gives federal judges the power and freedom to weigh tribal interests. See
McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973); Note, Indian Law-Jurisdiction-
"Closing the Door to Federal Court," 1978 LAND & WATER L. REv. 14:625 (1979).
40. See note 5, supra. See also McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973);
Note, Indian Sovereignty and Judicial Interpretations of the Indian CivilRights Act, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 897, 899-905.
41. "Congress has not given the Solicitor General authority to waive the immunity
of an Indian tribe." Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 170 n.9
(1977). See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); COHEN, supra note 2, at 283. Cf.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978).
42. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). A waiver of a tribe's sovereign im-
munity is similarly sacrosanct. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Therefore, a tribe's appearance on behalf of an individual tribal member is not a waiver,
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); nor does a tribe's ac-
ceptance of state benefits constitute an abandonment of sovereign immunity, see Mashpee
Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 587 (Ist Cir. 1979). Since sovereign immunity
is an affirmative defense, the failure to raise it may constitute a waiver, but as a sovereign
power (like others not relinquished) it cannot necessarily be presumed to be waived. See
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
43. Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.9 (1982); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
44. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122-23; Note, A New Constitutional Approach to the
Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 371 (1978).
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limitations such as individual rights." This view was crystallized
by the Supreme Court in 1896 in Talton v. Mayes: "As the
powers of local government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation ex-
isted prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the
Fifth Amendment, which, . . .had for its sole object to control
the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National Gov-
ernment. ' 46 The Talton progeny has extended this concept be-
yond the fifth amendment to other provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.47
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act48 to safe-
guard the rights of individuals from tribal authorities. The Act
was intended to harmonize the federal policy of tribal self-gov-
ernment, the need for substantive protection of individual rights,
and the values inherent in tribal cultures.49 The "broad constitu-
tional rights afforded to other Americans" were now to be
secured for American Indians.5" Congress's deliberate choice of
"any person" and "the people" rather than "American Indians"
makes it clear that Act is specifically intended to apply to both
Indians and non-Indians who may be subject to a tribe's civil
jurisdiction .5
In the first decade after the Civil Rights Act, federal courts had
difficulty applying constitutional standards to Indian tribes."2
The Supreme Court eliminated the erratic interpretations in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.5 Santa Clara presents the most useful
45. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 382 (1896); COHEN, supra note 2, at 123.
46. 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896).
47. Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1967) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Native American
Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) (first amendment); Barta
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.) (fourteenth amendment), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 932 (1958); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.) (fifth amend-
ment), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960, reh. denied, 357 U.S. 924 (1957).
48. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976).
49. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978); Wounded Head v.
Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); McCurdy v. Steele,
353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973).
50. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978).
51. See cases cited at note 6, supra.
52. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974); Note, Constitutional Law: Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Membership and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 6 Am. IN-
DIAN L. REV. 205, 212-14 (1978).
53. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). See Note, supra note 52; 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMMISSION 210-12 (1977).
19811 NOTES
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analysis of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court con-
sidered three crucial issues:
(a) There is no waiver of immunity to suit in federal court
under the Act;
(b) The Act was intended to strengthen the tribe in relation
to individual rights and tribal court is the proper place to take
challenges to ICRA violations, and;
(c) Habeas corpus relief is the only available remedy under
the Act.
Before Santa Clara, federal courts held the Indian Civil Rights
Act to waive tribal immunity."s The courts reasoned that since the
Act was designed to protect individuals against tribal abuses,
Congress must have intended federal court jurisdiction for all al-
leged violations." In the process, the courts ignored the traditional
concept of sovereign immunity: suits against the sovereign require
explicit consent. There is nothing on the face of the Act expressly
waiving immunity, though, concededly, Congress had the power
to do so. 6 Thus, the courts should have interpreted this failure to
act as a deliberate intention not to waive immunity. Santa Clara
reaffirms and strengthens the premises that (1) sovereign immuni-
ty must be "unequivocally" waived;" (2) a waiver cannot be in-
ferred from silence;58 and (3) the courts must "tread lightly in the
absence of clear legislative intent."'" Courts may no longer
assume that alleged deprivations of individual rights create a
waiver of tribal immunity in federal court.
The only federal court relief expressly available for an Indian
Civil Rights Act violation is habeas corpus."0 The Supreme Court
in Santa Clara interpreted this as a limited form of relief deliber-
ately designed to provide a less obtrusive review from de novo re-
view6' and as an alternative to other relief which Congress had
54. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975) (following
Santa Clara this case resurfaced as 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980)); Daly v. United States,
483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F.
Supp. 1194 (D.S.D. 1975).
55. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc.
v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
56. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
57. Id. at 58. See also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
58. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
59. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 68 (1978).
60. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
61. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978).
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the power to authorize. Claims against the tribe that sought other
relief did not create a waiver. 62 Habeas corpus relief, the Court
said, was the only relief necessary to "fulfill the purposes of the
ICRA.,,6"
The primary goal of the Indian Civil Rights Act was to engraft
specific constitutional provisions into the existing tribal political
systems which embody the unique cultural, social, and economic
interests of the tribes. 6 The autonomous tribal governments were
not to be undermined or uprooted but accorded deference in re-
solving civil matters within their jurisdiction. 65 As the Court said
in Santa Clara, those "issues likely to arise in a civil context will
frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom
which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than
federal courts." ' 66 The Act was not intended to open new forums
but to change the operation of tribal forums to ensure that indi-
vidual rights are protected.67 Justice Marshall stated:
[I]mplication of a federal remedy in addition to habeas corpus is
not plainly required to give effect to Congress' objective of ex-
tending constitutional norms to tribal self-government ...
Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting im-
portant personal and property interests of both Indians and
non-Indians.68
Santa Clara is less clear whether the tribal court must be the
forum for civil rights challenges. Can a plaintiff argue that it is
futile or potentially a mockery of justice to use the tribal court?69
62. A person can state a claim alleging that the tribe violated a provision of the Act
(see note 4, supra), but relief other than habeas corpus would not constitute a waiver. In-
junctive or declaratory relief and monetary damages are not available to a plaintiff suing
on an Indian Civil Rights Act claim in federal court.
63. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
64. Id. at 62, 75.
65. Id. at 61-71.
66. Id. at 71.
67. Note, Indian Law-Jurisdiction-"Closing the Door to Federal Court," LAND &
WATER L. REV. 14:625 (1979).
68. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
69. Kenai Oil & Gas v. Dep't of Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521 (D. Utah 1981), suggests
that such an argument alone is insufficient to obtain federal court jurisdiction. The court
did find, however, that if a plaintiff exhausted available tribal remedies and still was
unable to get a fair hearing, federal court jurisdiction would be appropriate. Id. at 531.
But see Takes Gun v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 448 F. Supp. 1222 (D. Mont. 1978) (where
such litigation would be futile if tribal court parties would not be required to exhaust
remedies that would be available in form only).
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A requirement that all tribal remedies70 be exhausted prior to
seeking any federal court action would strengthen the tribal gov-
ernments and reaffirm the concept that tribal forums are appro-
priate for vindicating the individual rights created by the Act.7 If
a tribe (or tribal official executing tribal policy) abridges provi-
sions of the Indian Civil Rights Act, such as freedom of speech,
the imposition of excessive fines, or the taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation, habeas corpus relief is inappro-
priate. It is logical, therefore, that claims against a tribe be filed
in the tribal forum. In this respect a tribe's immunity to suit in its
own court may be implicitly waived."
Tribal Forums and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Justice Marshall's analysis in Santa Clara of the relationship of
individual rights to tribal sovereign immunity caused federal
courts to reassess challenges by non-Indians to tribal government
conduct. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes"
represents a situation capable of repetition on other reservations.
In that case the only access road to a non-Indian-owned lodge on
the Wind River Reservation was closed under the direction of the
tribal government. As a result, the business was closed and the
owners were subjected to foreclosure.74 The non-Indian plaintiffs
70. See McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 656-57 (10th Cir. 1974); O'Neal v.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); Brunette v. Dann, 417 F.
Supp. 1382 (]). Idaho 1976); Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236 (D.S.D. 1976);
Citizens League for Civil Rights, Inc. v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Wis. 1978).
71. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
72. Id. at 59-60; Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173
(1977). Suits against the tribes in tribal courts would not violate the premise of United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940), that a sovereign
"possessing immunity should not be compelled to defend ... away from its own territory
. . ."; nor would such suits undermine tribal authority or self-determination. See Santa
Clara, supra, at 59-60.
73. 623 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. The plaintiffs Cook, who are non-Indians, owned a ranch and 160 acres of fee
land on the Wind River Reservation for about ten years. The only access to their property
was by a dirt road that crossed several properties held by Indian families. Though the
Cooks never had a right-of-way, use was never denied. In 1974 the plaintiffs obtained a
$250,000 Small Business Administration loan to convert their ranch to a guest lodge for
hunting. The owners failed to obtain the necessary commercial right-of-way from one of the
Indian families, the Bonatsies, before the lodge was completed. On the day of the formal
opening the Bonatsies sought and obtained assistance from the Joint Business Council of
the Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes to blockade the road. Subsequently, Dry Creek Lodge
was forced to close and legal action ensued for injunctive relief and damages.
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sought, but were denied, access to the most logical forum,7" the
tribal court. Suit was then filed against the tribes in federal dis-
trict court for injunctive relief and damages under the Indian
Civil Rights Act.
The Dry Creek Lodge court interpreted Santa Clara narrowly,
distinguishing it as limited to internal tribal matters involving
tribal members who had an available tribal forum.7" The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned that sovereign immunity
under the Indian Civil Rights Act was inextricably linked to the
availability of a tribal forum and denial of such a forum created a
basis for federal court jurisdiction. The court ignored the strong
language of Santa Clara that the Act was intended to preserve tri-
bal autonomy and foster self-determination. Furthermore, it mis-
construed the reference to tribal court functions. The tribal
forum is the appropriate place to first address due process and
equal protection; the refusal of the tribal court to stipulate to Dry
Creek's access does not imply a waiver of tribal immunity. The
court focused upon language in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,77 holding that tribes are prohibited from exercising powers
"expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsis-
tent with their status.'"" The court reasoned that because Con-
gress can limit tribal sovereignty, it is not illogical for the govern-
ment's manifested preference for protection of individual rights
and personal liberties to be considered as a limitation on the tribe.
Therefore, any "unwarranted intrusion" on personal liberty79
would be fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with the underly-
ing intent of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The failure of the Arap-
ahoe and Shoshone tribes to provide access to tribal court, there-
fore, implicitly waived their immunity to suit, and the federal
court had jurisdiction over the non-Indian's claim.
In the court's zeal to fashion a remedy, it neglected the Act's
75. According to 25 C.F.R. § 11.22, the tribal court has jurisdiction over all suits
where the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within its jurisdiction and where
the suits are between members and nonmembers, both parties to the action must stipulate
or consent to jurisdiction of the court. The tribal court refused to consent to the suit by
the Dry Creek Lodge plaintiffs.
76. 623 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1980). Contra, Trans-Canada Enter., Ltd. v.
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1980); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort
Belknap Housing Auth., 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981).
77. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
78. Id. at 208 (emphasis by the court). See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe &
Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
79. 623 F.2d at 684.
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broad application to both Indians and non-Indians and the re-
quirement that a tribe's immunity to suit must be explicit and un-
equivocal.8 0 According to the Dry Creek Lodge court, statutory
limits upon relief under the Act "disappear when the issue relates
to a matter outside the internal tribal affairs and when it concerns
an issue with a non-Indian.''8 This assertion is contrary to the
language of the Act and the legislative history, which reflect Con-
gress's intent to protect the rights of Indians and non-Indians.
The court also misconstrues Santa Clara as focusing upon the
availability of a tribal forum to the Indian plaintiff. Justice Mar-
shall clearly stated that tribal forums are appropriate for the "ex-
clusive adjudication of disputes affecting . . . both Indians and
non-Indians. '82 The Dry Creek Lodge court then stresses that
since there "has to be a forum" and a remedy for violation of
"constitutional rights," 83 there is an implicit waiver of immunity.
Waivers, however, depend upon "clear indications of legislative
intent" and not upon the need for a forum."' Santa Clara makes
it clear that asserted violations of due process and equal protec-
tion rights do not waive tribal immunity. The court of appeals de-
cision improperly negates the tribe's inherent authority to deter-
mine the manner for resolving its conflicts. Perhaps the argument
should not be that denial of a tribal forum constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity, but that the sovereign subjects itself to suit
when its agents act in an unconstitutional manner. 5
The same conflict between due process rights and sovereign im-
munity was posed in R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing
Authority16 Williams had a contract with the Fort Belknap
Housing Authority to build homes on the reservation. As the pro-
ject neared completion, a dispute arose and the Housing Authori-
ty obtained an order from the tribal court attaching Williams's
property. 8 7 Williams sued the tribal court and Housing Authority
80. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535 (1980), Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
81. 623 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
82. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
83. 623 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
84. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). See generally United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895).
85. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
86. 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981).
87. See note 13, supra.
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in federal court for injunctive relief and damages, alleging four
jurisdictional bases."
Although the court stated its belief that Williams's due process
rights were violated by the attachment, Judge Hatfield refused to
follow the Dry Creek Lodge reasoning. Though considering Santa
Clara "absurd" and "broad, uncategorical and regrettably not
confined to the facts," he nevertheless conceded that Santa Clara
was the prevailing rule of law.89 "Section 1302 does not impliedly
authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either
the Tribe or its officers." 90 Therefore, Williams could not obtain
his desired relief in federal court.
The court made two arguments in an unsuccessful attempt to
distinguish Santa Clara. First, tribal membership constitutes a
"more weighty" issue in tribal self-government than an issue of
contract law, which does not raise questions of tribal tradition
and custom. 91 This argument is weak, however, because a non-
Indian's commercial relationship with a tribe involves more than
routine issues of contract law. Contract negotiations and manage-
ment are important aspects of a tribe's autonomy and are pri-
mary means of defining the tribe's relationship to the external
world.
Second, the court stressed that the plaintiff in Santa Clara had
access to tribal court and, therefore, redress for her claim under
the Indian Civil Rights Act. This distinction fails since Williams
refused to consent to the jurisdiction of the tribal court92 and did
not demonstrate that a tribal forum would have proven futile or
unfair.93
Williams was conducting business on the reservation and could
have entered tribal court alleging conversion, breach of contract,
or deprivation of due process. His election of federal remedy was
a deliberate avoidance of the tribe's sovereign authority and was
fatal to his claim. The court concluded that: "This court, there-
fore, must reluctantly hold that, although plaintiffs have a
88. See note 14, supra.
89. 509 F. Supp. 933, 939, 941 (1. Mont. 1981).
90. Id. at 939.
91. Id.
92. As a party plaintiff,-Williams had access to tribal court under the extant Tribal
Law and Order Code, section 14.1, but purposefully chose not to use that forum. The cir-
cumstances here are also distinct from Dry Creek Lodge v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes,
623 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1980), where the non-Indian plaintiff desired access to tribal court
and was denied.
93. See text accompanying note 71, supra.
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federal right to due process in any proceeding by the Tribe to
take plaintiff's property, plaintiffs have no legitimate remedy-
federal or tribal-to redress the alleged violation of that federal
right." 94
Habeas corpus was not the proper relief for Williams in federal
court, but a remedy was available to him in tribal court. His right
to due process is not the constitutional protection of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments but was created by the Indian Civil
Rights Act and could be addressed in the tribal forum."' The Act
creates no other private causes of action and federal courts can-
not rewrite the law and deny the tribe's authority over the con-
duct and disputes arising on the reservations.
The integrity of tribal sovereignty largely depends upon the
wisdom and fairness with which the laws are exercised in tribal
territory. The history of federal-Indian legal relations96 demon-
strates that the federal government has doubted the capacity of
tribes to govern and has readily limited tribal powers when deemed
to be in the national interest. 97 The Indian Civil Rights Act shows
Congress's concern for the individual rights of persons under tri-
bal jurisdiction and for strengthening the role of tribal govern-
ment in addressing those rights. The increasing contact, and po-
tential for conflict, with non-Indians on the reservation increases
the tribes' need to preserve their sovereignty while protecting the
rights of individuals.
Jurisdiction over non-Indians is of vital concern if tribes are to
maintain their integrity as true sovereigns. In Montana v. United
States, the Supreme Court said:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to ex-
ercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate through taxations, licensing or other means, the activi-
ties of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements.98
94. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 509 F. Supp. 933, 941 (D.
Mont. 1981).
95. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978).
96. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (tribes as dependent communities,
weak and helpless requiring government protection); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (tribes in status of ward).
97. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Babbitt Ford, Inc. v.
Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F. Supp. 418 (D. Ariz. 1981).
98. 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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Santa Clara indicates that under the Indian Civil Rights Act a
tribal forum is appropriate for the vindication of alleged viola-
tions of civil rights. 99 Dry Creek Lodge and Williams suggest that
tribes have the authority to, and should, develop adjudicative
systems that combine traditional values and constitutional
safeguards to promote fundamental fairness for Indians and non-
Indians alike.
In Dry Creek Lodge and Williams, tribal governments were ac-
cused of violating non-Indians' civil rights. Contrary to the Dry
Creek Lodge holding, Santa Clara has made it clear that there is
no waiver of the tribes' sovereign immunity under the Indian Civil
Rights Act.' 0 Tribes cannot, however, insulate themselves from
statutory due process and equal protection requirements. 10' Santa
Clara should be read as implying a waiver to suit in tribal court
because tribal "forums are available to vindicate rights created by
the ICRA" and have been repeatedly recognized as the proper
forum for the "exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting im-
portant personal and property interests of both Indians and non-
Indians."' 2 Indians and non-Indians with civil rights claims
should exhaust available remedies before seeking federal court re-
view, except for habeas corpus.'03
To read Santa Clara otherwise gives credence to the Dry Creek
Lodge premise that only Indians are prevented from suing in fed-
eral courts on violations under the Act. Such an interpretation
cannot withstand the statute's due process requirements. A non-
Indian who enters into a commercial or contractual relationship
With a tribe must have access to the tribal court. If access is
99. 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
100. Id. at 59. Accord, Trans-Canada Enter., Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634
F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1980).
101. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), indicates that due process, equal protec-
tion, and other constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amend-
ment do not apply to Indian tribes. The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(1976), is a statutory guarantee of selectively incorporated aspects of the Bill of Rights.
See note 4, supra.
102. 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
103. Prior to Santa Clara, many cases interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act as requir-
ing an exhaustion of tribal remedies. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.
1974); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); Brunette v.
Dann, 417 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Idaho 1976); Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236
(D.S.D. 1976).
Santa Clara reaffirms the role of tribal courts as the forum for adjudicating civil
rights claims and, implicitly, requires exhaustion. Exhaustion of tribal remedies, however,
does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Cf. Kenai Oil & Gas v. Dep't of In-
terior, 522 F. Supp. 521 (D. Utah 1981).
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denied, it is likely that non-Indian contractors, business people,
or potential agents will refuse to do business for fear of having no
remedy.
The Arapahoe-Shoshone Tribal Court in Dry Creek Lodge and
the Fort Belknap Tribal Court in Williams were like those on
many reservations10 4 and required consent by both parties for
suits by nontribal members. This is consistent with the Code of
Federal Regulations model which premises jurisdiction on "stipu-
lation."'' 0 This requirement allowed the tribes in Dry Creek
Lodge to deny access to the non-Indians and allowed Williams to
evade the tribe's jurisdiction. The stipulation provision denies
due process and, perhaps, equal protection as mandated by the
Indian Civil Rights Act.
Jurisdiction and access to tribal court could apply the tradi-
tional minimum contacts standard for personam jurisdiction.1 6
In both Dry Creek Lodge and Williams, the plaintiffs would have
also qualified by the implied standards of Montana v. United
States that jurisdiction exists when the dispute arises out of a
"consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements" or
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe."'0 7
In justifying its concern for the non-Indians' lack of access to
tribal court, the Dry Creek Lodge court cited Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe's expression of fear of "unwarranted intrusion
on ... personal liberty."'' 0  Oliphant is distinguishable because it
involved the tribe's criminal jurisdiction. A tribe's civil jurisdic-
tion affords the victim an opportunity to be compensated rather
than punished. The fear of intrusion expressed in Oliphant is less
obvious in civil litigation where non-Indians have voluntarily
come within a tribe's jurisdiction. 0
104. NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGEs Ass'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE
FUTURE 47-48 (1978).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 11.22 provides that tribal courts-
shall have jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or
tribes within their jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and nonmem-
bers which are brought before the courts by stipulation of both parties. No judgment
shall be given on any suit unless the defendant has actually received notice of such suit
and ample opportunity to appear in court in his defense.
106. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
107. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). See also Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe,
519 F. Supp. 418 (D. Ariz. 1981).
108. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 683, 684 (10th
Cir. 1980).
109. The non-Indian who is allegedly wronged on the reservation must take the initia-
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Jurisdiction of the tribal court does not mean tribal immunity
should be abandoned. Rather than force Congress to establish
waivers, tribal governments should reexamine the scope of their
immunity. Habeas corpus relief available under the Indian Civil
Rights Act is inadequate. Consideration should be given to allow-
ing suits against tribal officers who act ultra vires or in violation
of due process and to providing writs of mandamus to compel the
application of the Act's "constitutional" guarantees. Tribes
should also consider modifying their immunity from suit' 0 by
creating a tribal analog of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 a tribal version of
the Federal Tort Claims Act,' or a waiver similar to that in the
Administrative Procedures Act." 3
The tribes must determine how to accommodate individual
rights within their cultural, political, and social framework. Self-
determination means that the tribes must define their relation-
ships with the external world and identify those with whom their
legal systems have contact. It is difficult to view the denial of a
judicial forum to non-Indians as a means of strengthening tribal
sovereignty. Furthermore, tribes ignore their own traditions of
equity and fairness when parties such as Dry Creek Lodge, Inc.,
and Williams are deprived of their property without an oppor-
tunity to be heard. It is doubtful that Congress, in the exercise of
its plenary power, will permit non-Indians to be deprived of a
remedy when their rights are allegedly violated. It is not incon-
ceivable that Congress would severely curtail tribal civil jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians, following logic similar to that found in
Oliphant."4
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Puyallup "Tribe v. Washing-
ton Dep't of Game regarding the viability of the doctrine of tribal
immunity"' suggests that Dry Creek Lodge and/or Williams
tive to obtain compensation. Since the compensation is limited to the amount of damage
suffered, it is questionable whether there is any "intrusion." See Babbitt Ford, Inc. v.
Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F. Supp. 418 (D. Ariz. 1981).
110. Since a tribe can consent to a waiver of its immunity, it is logical that a tribe can
enact its own legislation to modify its tribal immunity. Cf. Turner v. United States, 248
U.S. 354 (1919). See also COHEN, supra note 2, at 283-84.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) protects individuals against the deprivation of rights,
privileges, and immunities secured under the Constitution by persons acting under color of
state law. Tribes could enact legislation to protect Indians and non-Indians from depriva-
tion of rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act by tribal officials or those "acting under
color of tribal law." Damages and equitable relief would be analogously appropriate.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
114. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
115. 433 U.S. 165 (1977). See text accompanying note 3, supra.
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could be the appropriate type of case for reviewing sovereign im-
munity. Unless tribes act to protect the rights of both Indians and
non-Indians within their jurisdiction, Congress may strip the
tribes of a crucial aspect of their sovereignty.
Conclusion
The Indian Civil Rights Act was intended to preserve and
strengthen tribal government while safeguarding the individual
rights of all people against potential tribal abuses. The Act pro-
vides a single remedy in federal court-habeas corpus relief-for
alleged deprivations of civil rights. The Supreme Court in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez made it clear that tribal forums are ap-
propriate for enforcing the rights created under the Indian Civil
Rights Act and implied that the tribe itself may be subject to suit
in its own court."" Since the plaintiff, Julia Martinez, was a
tribal member, Santa Clara has raised questions in subsequent
cases concerning the Act's application to non-Indians on the res-
ervation.
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Araphoe & Shoshone Tribes held
that where a tribal remedy is unavailable, the non-Indian could
seek relief in federal court. This holding contradicts the tradi-
tional doctrine of sovereign immunity, the express language of
the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Supreme Court's holding in
Santa Clara. But, Dry Creek Lodge and a similar case, R.J.
Williams v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, demonstrates that
real tension exists between sovereign immunity, which is crucial
for tribal self-preservation, and individual rights, which are
equally crucial in defining tribal sovereignty. This tension is one
the tribes must resolve so that Congress and the Supreme Court
do not act to further modify tribal sovereignty. The tribes' viabil-
ity as true sovereigns requires that they take steps to harmonize
their inherent right of tribal immunity with the individual civil
rights of both Indians and non-Indians on the reservation.
116. 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
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